This paper uses a two-period overlapping generations model in order to provide a theoretical design for an optimal public pension system based on a partial equilibrium analysis. Household preferences only depend on two periods consumption and leisure and is homogeneous of degree m with respect to consumption in the working and retired periods. We present characteristic features of an optimal public pension system in this paper. First, differences in the population growth rate do not affect the relative level of the optimal net lifetime burden rate of each generation. Second, if
Introduction
Although considerable research exists on public pension plans, such as the studies by Feldstein (1995 Feldstein ( , 1998 of the possibility for social welfare improvement based on a transition process from the pay-as-you-go system to the funded system, most work in this area theoretically and empirically examines the effectiveness and fairness of existing and reformed plans. By contrast, few studies have been carried out on designing an optimal pension plan (but see Oguro, 2008) . The present paper thus uses a simplified overlapping generations (OLG) model in order to analyze the characteristics of an optimal public pension system that maximizes the sum of indirect utilities of each generation under its intertemporal budget constraint. The presented theoretical analysis thus aims to bridge this gap in the current body of knowledge on this topic.
Little research exists specifically on optimal public pension plans owing to analytical difficulties. In particular, the characteristics of the two macroeconomic models applied to such research, namely the representative household model and OLG model, hinder the analysis of optimal taxation. Well-known arguments in favor of the former are offered by Barro (1979 Barro ( , 1999 and Bohn (1990) on tax smoothing and by Judd (1999) regarding dynamic optimal taxation. However, as the representative household model does not usually involve generation alternation, it is difficult to analyze a public pension plan (e.g., a pay-as-you-go system), which is an intergenerational income distribution policy.
The OLG models proposed by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) assume generation alternation and thus facilitate the consideration of public pension plans. However, unlike the representative household model, the key agents in these models increase by number of generations, further complicating the theoretical analysis. Therefore, most research carried out since the seminal 4 achievements presented by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) tends to adopt a multi-period OLG model for the empirical analysis in order to adapt the influence of current pension plans and reforms to the utility of each generation.
To avoid the summation of indirect utilities diverging to infinity it is necessary for the sequence of utilities in this paper to be discounted using the time-preference rate. We designate this rate the "social time-preference rate" in order to differentiate it from the interest rate, which we term the "market time-preference rate." In the first step of designing our optimal pension plan, we suggest three simplifications to the traditional OLG model, which can cope with an infinite number of households and goods. First, we ignore the general equilibrium and instead adopt a partial equilibrium analysis. Second, although the pay-as-you-go pension systems in most countries consist of two parts (e.g., the basic pension and the income proportional pension), we recognize only income proportional payments for the sake of simplicity. Third, we use a typical two-period OLG model (e.g., working period and retired period) and assume that each household's utility depends on two periods of consumption and labor. Thus, we assume that the utility function is homogeneous of degree m with respect to consumption in the working and retired periods.
Assuming the first simplification above allows us to set wage income and the interest rate as exogenous variables. By contrast, wage income and the interest rate become a function of the pension benefit rate and premium rate in the general equilibrium model, rendering optimal pension 5 plan characteristics extremely difficult to analyze. By considering the second simplification, the analysis of the optimal pension plan becomes the determination of the net lifetime burden rate of each generation, as pension benefits and premiums are a fixed proportion of lifetime wage income under the lifetime budget constraint of households. Therefore, the proposed optimal pension plan design resembles the discussions of Barro (1979 Barro ( , 1999 , Bohn (1990), and Judd (1999) . Finally, the third simplification clarifies the social welfare function, as shown in Lemmas 1 and 2 in Section 2.
The following points summarize the characteristics of the optimal pension plan proposed in this paper:
(1) The differences in population growth rates do not affect the relative level of the net lifetime burden rate of each generation. (2-1) The optimal pension system can be expressed explicitly.
(2-2) The optimal pension plan decreases the net lifetime burden rate of the generation with the higher growth rate of lifetime wage income.
(2-3) If the social time-preference rate is sufficiently larger than the market time-preference rate, then an increase in the population growth rate of some generations would reduce the net lifetime burden rate of each generation under an optimal pension system.
(2-4) If the social time-preference rate is larger (smaller) than that of the market, the net lifetime 6 burden rate of future generations would be closer to 100% (increase the current generation's net lifetime burden, while reducing the net lifetime burden of future generations).
(2-5) If the social time-preference rate is equal to that of the market, the net lifetime burden rate of future generations under an optimal pension plan would converge to the same level (i.e., the smoothing of the net lifetime burden of each generation holds at a certain point in time).
, with the possible exception of one generation, the net lifetime burden of each generation would become either 100% or 0%.
Point (1) is crucial for the pension plan design presented herein. Although Japan's declining birthrate implies an increasing pension burden on future generations from a conventional viewpoint,
(1) suggests that when comparing the net lifetime burden of one generation to that of another, the relative level of the net burden should remain unaffected by a change in the population growth rate under an optimal pension system. By contrast, as described in (2-3), the population growth rate affects the net lifetime burden rate for all generations. Further, (2-2) indicates that a "regressive" plan is desirable for the net lifetime burden of each generation under an optimal pension system. This study's analysis is based on the assumption that each generation behaves selfishly without displaying dynastic altruism. Barro (1974) argues that when there exist inheritance transfers among generations and intergenerational altruism, the utility of each generation is influenced not only by its consumption but also by the descendants' utility, meaning that the OLG model is fundamentally 7 equivalent to the representative household model. However, Takayama, Aso, Miyaji, and Kamiya (1996) and Horioka (2002) show that intergenerational altruism is rarely evident in the analysis of inheritance distribution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 defines the optimal pension plan as the maximization of social welfare. Section 4 analyzes the relationship between the funded system and the net lifetime burden rate of each generation in order to demonstrate that the argument for the optimal plan under the pay-as-you-go system can be fully applied to that under the funded system. Section 5 concludes.
Consumer Choices and Government Budget

Consumer Decisions
Each generation lives for two periods (i.e., working period and retired period). The utility for the generation born in period t is as follows:  represents the pension benefit rate, expressing the pension to be received in multiples of the premium rate ( t  ). The upper limit of leisure provided during the working period is assumed to be 1. Further, by representing the interest rate as r , the budget constraint of generation t will be the following:
where s t is the saving. These can be consolidated into a single budget as:
Here, t  represents the net lifetime burden rate of generation t as follows:
This can be rewritten as 
We denote the solution of (3) 
This means that the functional form is the same when time is also expressed as 
Proof: In order to solve the problem of (3), we considered the following problem:
Let us denote solutions to the problem (3) and to (6) ) satisfies the budget in (6), the relation
Conversely, as the pair
m holds and, therefore, we can obtain
Since the utility function is strictly convex, the solution to maximization is unique. Therefore, the following holds:
As (6) does not include  (1)w as a parameter, we can confirm the following:
The above establishes the proof for (5).
Expressing utility as indirect utility and using Lemma 1, we obtain the following: 
Government Budget
An economy starts at period t = 0, when the working and retired generations already exist. In period t = 0, the government determines income transfer G to the retired generation, which is funded by tax revenue and the issuance of government bonds ( the government budget constraint is the following at period t = 0: 
In addition, there exists a positive real number ( q ) such that
, and the following condition exists:
First, this assumption signifies the following. If
holds at any given time, the national income growth rate ( t t n g  ) is greater than the interest rate ( r ) on government bonds. Thus, adopting a pay-as-you-go pension system increases the utility of the current generation without decreasing that of the future generation. In addition, the discounted value of national income in the future period will diverge to infinity. In this case, it is unnecessary to consider the burden on the pension plan; by definition, this type of economy does not require the careful consideration of an optimal public pension system. Next, t w is assumed to converge to a positive value:
This assumption is not considered to be a strict condition, because the price of goods in our model is normalized to be unity.
Note:
The following relationship holds:
We must consider the case
Based on the above considerations, the following lemma is achieved. In this lemma, t h is the demand function of leisure (
Lemma 2: Suppose that the pension premium rate ( t  , t=1, 2, 3,…) satisfies budgets (8) and (9), and that the No Ponzi Game condition holds as follows:
Then, if the government budget constraints (8) and (9) hold, the following also holds:
where
Proof: (Necessity) By rewriting (9), we obtain the following:
Then, reorganizing by writing the total wage income of generation t as
From the above equations with t=1, 2, 3,…, n and equation (8), we obtain the following: 
Adding the above results in:
In addition, the following also holds:
. This implies that the above term converges to zero as n tends to infinity. Furthermore, by using the No Ponzi Game condition (10), the government budget constraint can be summarized as: 
Then, we obtain the following:
1 r , t=1, 2, 3,… Therefore, the following also holds:
The above equation satisfies the government budget, including bonds, for each period. Then,
Game condition is satisfied as follows:
This lemma does not necessarily guarantee that the set of
 , which satisfies (11), is non-null.
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
Assumption 3:
By contrast, as shown below, the series
Maximization of Social Welfare
By using the indirect utility of each generation, we define the social welfare function as follows:
Here, R represents the social time-preference rate. Applying the results from (7) from Section 2, we obtain the following:
In addition, 
By canceling out  and  , we obtain the following:
In general, a comparison of two points in time t and ' t ( ' t t  ), results in the following:
These results signify the following concerning a comparison of generational burdens. (i) Assume that there is no change in the wage growth rate. If R is larger than r ( r is larger than R ), the larger the value, a higher (lower) net lifetime burden rate of the relative future generation (generation ' t ), in comparison to the net lifetime burden rate of the past generation 3 Attention must be paid to the following equalities as well:
(ii) Assume that the interest rate is equal to the social time-preference rate. A relatively low net lifetime burden rate of the generation with the higher wage income increase rate is desirable.
(iii) The relative level of the net lifetime burden rate of each generation is not influenced by the population growth rate.
The significance of (iii) is critical, as it asserts that a change in the population growth rate should not affect the relative burden of the public pension system compared with the net lifetime burdens for each generation. In addition, (ii) argues that the burden on the generation that has a low wage income increase rate should be increased and affirms that "a regressive system for pension burden is desirable."
Two items need to be noted concerning Theorem 1. First, it indicates that population growth does not influence the relative value of optimal burden rates. In other words, it implies that population growth may influence the absolute value of the burden. Second, Theorem 1 indicates that (i) holds if there exists an optimal solution; therefore, it cannot be determined at this point whether the inequality " R r  " itself is consistent or not with a configuration of the problem.
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The relative level of the net lifetime burden rate does not always clarify the degree of influence from the change in the population growth rate or explain what the results of (i) reveal about optimization.
Let us thus pursue an explicit form of solution in order to clarify these factors. We know that (15) holds for t=1, 2, 3,…. Then we obtain the following:
Here,
. Using the constraints of an optimized pension plan, we define α as follows:
and, therefore, we have the explicit solution of the optimal burden:
At this point, we assume that values for  and 
Here, (iv) The optimal net lifetime burden rates of the public pension system for each generation are expressed in equations (16) Theorems 1 and 2 allow us to perform a relative generational comparison of an optimal pension system with the characteristics of the net lifetime burden rate. Next, we shall examine movements of the optimal pension system through time. 
, t = 1, 2, 3,… we can rewrite the above equality as follows:
The right-hand side of this equation is a power series. According to Cauchy-Hadamard's theorem, the convergence radius k of this power series can be expressed as:
In addition, the inequality q r n n a
. Two cases can be distinguished as follows:
The possibility of    , which was excluded from Theorem 2. This indicates that (A) above must also be eliminated. Furthermore, we have 4 See Yoshida (1965, p. 15) . 5 We are grateful to Ryo Ishida for pointing out that the sufficiently large t restriction is essential.
) (
Assuming w t converges to w, and using the results from (B), we have three differing cases of parameters that determine the temporal value of an optimal pension,
By expressing the average value of period t as  n t for the change in the population growth rate from period 0 to t-1, we obtain the following: 

The burden rates for each generation in (case 1) to (case 3) above are described below. r is the market interest rate, which thus expresses the market time-preference rate. Accordingly, x is the ratio of the market to social time-preference rates.
Let us consider (case 1)
Here, the following apply:
indicates R r  . At this point, the social time-preference rate is lower than the market time-preference rate and the market may be more short-sighted than society.
In this case, the results show that it is preferable to place a larger burden on the current generation and reduce the burden on future generations by offering subsidies. 
Finally, let us consider (case 3)
. This indicates that the social time-preference rate is higher than that of the market and that society is more short-sighted than the market. The burden rate   t * for each generation is as follows. At this point,
and it is thus preferable to place the burden on future generations. (vi) When the market time-preference rate exceeds the social time-preference rate, a negative value is preferable for the net lifetime burden rate after a certain generation in order to increase future consumption.
(vii) When the market and social time-preference rates match, the optimal burden rates will converge at a certain value.
(viii) When the market time-preference rate falls below the social time-preference rate, a nearly 100% burden rate is preferable for future generations.
Of the above results, (vii) can be considered to extend the tax smoothing theorems proposed by Barro (1979 Barro ( , 1999 and Bohn (1990) . First, their research assumes r R  , which is equivalent to the 27 assumption in (vii) of x = 1. Second, G is assigned to the initial period in the current model, which is completely plausible in this discussion even when G is considered to be the total public expenditure of each period (discounted value). Finally, if the limit rate of burden
 is a positive value and time t is sufficiently large, the value of * t  lies in a small positive interval, signifying burden smoothing.
The case with
1  m Until this subsection, the constraint proposed in equation (13) 
holds. At this time, we assume a series of sufficiently small positive numbers for 0   , based on the following:
This operation is called ε-conversion. Then, because 
holds for a sufficiently small 0   . Therefore, since "    0" holds in this case, we also obtain
The solution in (13), Next, we presume a series of t for
Below, we study this case from two perspectives: R r  and R r  .
When
holds. In other words, Step 2 Assume the solution to welfare maximization is   t * and t=0, 1, 2, 3,…. If 
1
This is the same equation as obtained in the proof Theorem 2. And thus we know that the same result as in Theorem 2 holds in the funded system. Accordingly, the argument put forward earlier can also be applied to a funded system.
Conclusion
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This paper used a two-period OLG model in order to put forward a theoretical design for an optimal public pension system based on a partial equilibrium analysis. Household preferences only depended on consumption and leisure. The following findings suggest that an optimal public pension system shares similar characteristics if the utility function of households is homogeneous of degree m with respect to consumption in the working and retired periods. First, differences in the population growth rate do not affect the relative level of the optimal net lifetime burden rate of each generation. Second, , the optimal public pension system can be expressed explicitly. Thus, the difference between the market time-preference rate and social time-preference rate provides a crucial insight into the optimal burden rate of each generation.
One limitation of this study is that we make assumptions based on certain preferences, such as homogeneity. The presented findings would be more worthwhile if it were possible to show these results more generally. We will carry out this task in subsequent research.
